<p>Arnold had established an Air War Plans Division in July 1941, drawing on a handful of the best officers he knew. Under Colonel Harold L. George, the group included Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth N. Walker, and Majors Heywood S. Hansell Jr and Laurence S. Kuter. Hansell had just come back from England where he had been collecting target data and the RAF's battle experience. All five officers had been associated closely with the Air Corps Tactical School, and all five were active proponents of air power. Arnold had chosen well.
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<p>They produced a first plan, AWPD/1, in seven days between 4 and 11 August. It concentrated on the European theater, laid out the target objectives, calculated the force necessary to destroy them, and estimated the requirements for pilots and total personnel strengths necessary to accomplish the plan. It was a hectic week, and when the plan was done it was briefed to higher authorities and accepted. Perhaps nobody at War Department level read it too carefully, because one of the features of the plan was a tacit assumption that the USAAF was co-equal with the Army and Navy.
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<p>AWPD/1 called for the disruption of the German electrical power system, the transportation system, and the oil/petroleum system, particularly two targets: the synthetic oil complex and the refinery complex at Ploesti. The intermediate objective was to neutralize the Luftwaffe.
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<p>Outwardly, the United States Army Air Forces were able to face the prospects of war with a brave front. It had a planned strategy, a planned collaboration with a strong and war-experienced ally, new facilities, filled classrooms and busy training fields. Industry was in full production, and would deliver about 20,000 planes during 1941. The USAAF itself was a reorganized command, more able to deal with the problems facing it. Things looked good.
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<p>The facts are otherwise. The country and its armed forces were hardly any more ready for war than they had been in 1917. The same problems were arising, the same mistakes were waiting to be made. And thousands of airmen had to die in hundreds of wasted airplanes, before there would be a real feeling of accomplishment and a measure of success.
